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This essay proceeds from two assumptions: first, 
that “reproduction” is a persistent but insufficiently 
recognized concept in scholarship in the field 
of childhood studies, and second, that “non-
reproduction” is the repository of reproduction’s 
negativity, which deserves its own conceptual 
development in the field. Both reproduction and non-
reproduction are necessary concepts for childhood 
studies: the first must be recognized as such, rather 
than taken for granted, while the second must be 
advocated as a viable site of thought. In the pages that 
follow, my goal is to offer some preliminary theses 
on non-reproduction as a concept for opening up 
our thinking about childhood. These theses appear 
in the final section of the essay. Along the way to 
that concluding section, I sketch some of the ways in 
which reproduction and non-reproduction structure 
our thinking already within and beyond childhood 
studies. Ultimately, I suggest that we position non-
reproduction not simply against but also within and 
beside reproduction in an effort to map new avenues of 
thought and new sites of inquiry for the field.
Origin Stories
The organizers of this panel invited participants to 
“question and interrogate familiar keywords used in the 
study of cultures of childhood and youth, and propose 
new terms and definitions to capture and understand 
the complexities and contradictions that define young 
peoples’ cultures and texts” (“Congress”). Each of us 
was asked to bring a familiar word that is used often in 
studies of youth, cultures, and texts and a new keyword 
that is not found in current keywords collections and 
that the presenter thought crucial to include. Coming 
from the field of queer studies (which has spent 
the better part of a decade debating Lee Edelman’s 
concept of “reproductive futurity,” a concept I will 
discuss shortly), I decided to suggest “reproduction” 
as my familiar word and “non-reproduction” as my 
new keyword. In the spirit of Raymond Williams’s 
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interest in the ways in which the “beginnings and 
endings” of ideas “are incorrigibly wayward” (2), 
I would follow the panel organizers’ advice and 
take an approach to “keywords in cultures of young 
people” that acknowledges that language is erratic and 
unpredictable.
My first stop on the “incorrigibly wayward” road 
was at the recent keyword collections that seemed 
most relevant to childhood studies. There, I discovered 
(much to my chagrin) that “reproduction” has never 
really been a keyword at all. Despite my conviction 
that the very concept of childhood was underwritten 
by thinking about reproduction, I was surprised to 
discover that “reproduction” does not make a single 
appearance in any of the published keyword texts. 
Philip Nel and Lissa Paul do not feature it in their 
Keywords for Children’s Literature, nor does it show 
up in Bruce Burgett and Glenn Hendler’s broader 
Keywords for American Cultural Studies. Williams 
himself did not include it in his Keywords book. I found 
myself foiled in my very effort to frame my intervention 
precisely in terms of the “keywords” books. This is not 
to negate the significance of “reproduction” for the 
field altogether—“social reproduction,” in particular, 
has been enormously important for many scholars 
in childhood studies.1 In fact, I began to think that 
perhaps this is not a keyword precisely because this 
term is so taken as given within a field defined by the 
biological results of sexual reproduction: the child.
Such, essentially, was the argument that Edelman 
made about the figure of the child in his 2004 polemic, 
No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. In 
defining “reproductive futurism,” he argues that “[t]he 
fantasy subtending the images of the Child invariably 
shapes the logic within which the political itself must 
be thought” (2). He then proceeds to uncover this 
reproductive logic, highlighting the extent to which it 
preserves “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity 
by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the 
political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to 
this organizing principle of communal relations” (2–3). 
The logic of reproduction, for Edelman, naturalizes 
and normalizes itself precisely through the figure and 
the fantasy of the child. No wonder it hides itself in 
plain sight so successfully, especially in childhood 
studies. Moreover, opposing this logic of “reproductive 
futurism,” says Edelman, is queerness. “Queerness,” 
he argues in one of the most frequently cited passages 
of his book, “names the side of those not fighting for 
the children, the side outside the consensus by which 
all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive 
futurism” (11). To be clear (and this is an important 
caveat), Edelman insists that it is the figure of the 
child—the child as rhetorical device and as concept—
that organizes politics, and this figure should not be 
confused with the lived experiences of any historical 
children. A queer politics for Edelman entails rejecting 
this logic of reproductive futurism and the child in 
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whose name it operates. Hence his famous diatribe: 
“Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name 
we’re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif 
from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; 
fuck Laws both with capital l’s and with small; fuck the 
whole network of Symbolic relations and the future 
that serves as its prop” (29). While Edelman’s argument, 
at the level of sentence and concept, requires great 
subtlety of thought, it proceeds with no such nuance 
in diagnosing the starkly divided sides of the political 
debate: there is the side of the child—the very 
embodiment of reproductive futurism—and there is  
the side of queerness, the site of resistance to that  
logic of reproduction.
I think Edelman is right to identify the ways in 
which reproduction underwrites the very logic of the 
social, although many scholars have voiced potent 
critiques of his argument.2 Rather than rehearse those 
debates about the child’s status within conservative 
politics as such, however, I want to suggest that we 
take Edelman’s own assumptions to their logical 
conclusion. Even in opposing the logic of reproductive 
futurism and the child who embodies it, is queerness 
not actually defined, even for Edelman, precisely in 
its (refused) relationship to the child? Might seeming 
opposites (the child and the queer, reproduction and 
non-reproduction) not be entangled or positioned 
alongside each other more complexly than they  
seem at first?
“The Age of Reproduction”?
In her October 2013 inaugural lecture as 
Cambridge University Chair of Sociology, Sarah 
Franklin declared ours to be “the age of reproduction,” 
insisting that scholars be attentive to the “reproductive 
turn in social thought.” Franklin recognizes that 
reproduction has long been both central to and 
insufficiently theorized within the social sciences and 
the natural sciences. This she terms the “reproductive 
paradox.” The “turn” she diagnoses nonetheless 
suggests that reproduction has become a newly 
significant object of social concern and academic 
inquiry that revolves around the making of babies. 
The child, in other words, is the very outcome of 
our reproductive logic, a logic we both embrace 
and disavow. Indeed, at a time when the rise of new 
technologies like IVF increasingly facilitate biological 
reproduction and when the “gayby” boom is in full 
swing, sociologists have focused attention on  
“stratified reproduction” (Colen), “distributed 
reproduction” (Murphy), and even “disciplining 
reproduction” (Clarke). Reproduction, it would seem, 
is in a period if not of academic boom then of new 
intellectual reflexivity.
If we take a long view of social thought to consider 
the ways in which social reproduction relies on and 
exceeds its purely biological form, we might conclude 
with Franklin that we have been in the “age of 
reproduction” for a much longer time than the present. 
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An emphasis on social or ideological reproduction alongside biological 
reproduction (and sometimes through it) can be traced quite nicely,  
for instance, through the extensive work of Marxist feminism and its 
abundant responses to the implicit patriarchalism of concepts like  
“the totality” and the problem of the capacity of capitalism to sustain  
itself across generations.3 The “age of reproduction” is the era not only 
of new technologies for producing new generations of humans but also, 
arguably, of the capitalist enterprise, one that has never been able to  
do without reproducing new generations of labourers. In light of both  
the rush to coin a new era defined by “reproduction” and the  
simultaneous fact of reproduction’s long duration, it seems appropriate  
to recognize “reproduction” as a foundational concept, if not actually a 
well-established keyword.
The history of the word “reproduction” contains some interesting 
counterfactuals, however. To modern eyes, it might seem that biological 
reproduction comes first, followed by social reproduction. Such a 
progression would seem to follow from conventional understandings of 
socialization or development: biology creates a tabula rasa on which the 
terms and conventions of social life come to be inscribed. Such a reading 
accords with the French and Latin origins of the term, where reproduction 
(from reproductivio) serves as “the action by which living things perpetuate 
their species” (1690). Yet the earliest uses of the term recorded in the 
Oxford English Dictionary suggest that the circulation of the term in English 
is more amorphous. The first definition of the term is more generic—“The 
action or process of forming, creating, or bringing into existence 
again”—and the first recorded use of “reproduction” with a specifically 
biological frame of reference is from 1713. The social understanding of 
“reproduction,” in other words, predates its biological understanding. 
Furthermore, new definitions of reproduction (with respect to republishing, 
The “age of 
reproduction” is 
the era not only of 
new technologies 
for producing new 
generations of humans 
but also, arguably, of the 
capitalist enterprise . . . .
Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 7.2 (2015)152 Natasha Hurley
copying, and even regeneration in animals) emerge in 
tandem with a tension within the definitional evolution 
of “reproduction.” Perpetuating the species is not 
equivalent to making replacements or copies, as the 
compact OED account of the evolution of the term 
would suggest:
Latin reproductio (15th cent.), French reproduction 
action by which living things perpetuate their 
species (1690), action of reconstructing or 
recreating (1754), action of replacing industrially 
the assets which have been consumed (1758 in 
Quesnay: compare quot. 1991 at sense 1e), natural 
or artificial means of propagating plants (1762), (in 
an animal) natural replacement of a lost body part, 
organ, etc. (1769), action of republishing (1839), 
copy of a work of art (1839).
What seems clear both from the contemporary 
deployment of “reproduction” as well as the historical 
unfolding of the term is that it encapsulates within 
itself a series of contradictions and facilitates its own 
definitional spread. Biological reproduction exists 
alongside social reproduction as well as after it. The 
child is the result of human actions that perpetuate its 
species but is not the sole domain of reproduction. 
The figure of the child is spoken nowhere in this 
definition but implied everywhere. Likewise, nowhere 
in the definitional landscape is reproduction defined 
against its opposite, but non-reproduction haunts the 
OED definitions implicitly. Without reproduction, 
assets would not be replaced, species would not be 
perpetuated, lost body parts could not be restored, and 
works of art might not be copied. To conceptualize a 
non-reproductive relationship to childhood, then, is 
to uncover two different sites of what is axiomatic but 
unspoken within the field of “reproduction” itself.
The Ages and Futures of Non-reproduction
What is a non-reproductive relationship to 
childhood? Allow me the indulgence of making an 
example of myself. As a childless person, I come to 
the concept of non-reproduction honestly. I have no 
children. I have chosen not to have children. This does 
not mean I have no child relations, however. I am an 
aunt, a babysitter, a scholar (and therefore a consumer) 
of culture made by and for children. I also deploy 
childhood and its cultures strategically in contexts 
that are inappropriate to it (I use Peter Pan to explain 
concepts to adults). I consider children as abstractions 
when I think about voting and public policy. I engage 
in thought experiments that try to imagine what the 
world looks like for children who lack a normative 
family life. I wonder frequently about the overlaps 
between queer reproduction and eugenics projects. I 
sometimes treat my dog like a child. I think “arrested 
development” is another way to consider childhood 
beyond children. I am perplexed by Henry James’s 
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observation that “[t]he novel is older and so are the 
young” (249). I do not believe public life should be 
inherently child friendly or that people have a right to 
have children. The interests of parents and the interests 
of children are not the same. Not reproducing does 
not foreclose one’s relationship to childhood. How 
we conceptualize what counts as a relationship to 
childhood is more elastic than it might seem.
Nor is this range of cultural relationships to 
childhood lost on parents who benefit from the many 
ways people make relationships with what we might 
think of as “other people’s children.” In “After Mother’s 
Day,” Christina Lupton (herself a mother) describes her 
desire to write about
all the ways of tending to the world that are less 
easily validated than parenting, but which are just 
as fundamentally necessary for children to flourish. 
I mean here the writing and inventing and the 
politics and the activism; the reading and the public 
speaking and the protesting and the teaching and 
the filmmaking. These things are done by definition 
either by those who don’t have kids at home, or by 
those whose kids are being looked after by other 
people—by states, grand-parents, friends.
What Lupton gets at here, without naming it as such, 
is the phenomenon of the extra-parental. There are 
benefits to stranger sociability for children and for 
the concept of childhood. Those of us who eschew 
biological reproduction relate to children—real, 
imaginary, and conceptual—in a host of ways,  
some of which are even shared by traditionally 
reproductive subjects.
It must also be said that not reproducing (biologically) 
is no more radical a political act than not marrying. 
The childless and the “child-full” share investments in 
the problem and interruption of social reproduction, 
but non-reproduction prompts us at least to expand our 
thinking about social relationality within and beyond the 
normative terms of familial relations that govern the ways 
in which generations of humans interact with one another 
and in the name of one another. What it means to inhabit 
the logic of reproduction (social and biological), then, 
requires living as well with sites of non-reproduction.
Consider, again, Franklin’s coining of the phrase 
“the age of reproduction.” Such a diagnosis of this new 
era is rife with contradictions. While she refers to a 
technological era devoted to new methods for  
conceiving children, she argues that these methods 
themselves have the potential to organize new kinship 
structures. Furthermore, while the goal of these 
technologies is to facilitate biological reproduction,  
one of the effects of working with them, especially 
if, say, IVF does not work immediately, is to decrease 
(not increase) one’s chances for reproductive success. 
The process of reproducing can make one more non-
reproductive (see Franklin, Biological).
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Consider, as well, the statistical paradox of “the 
age of reproduction.” When it comes specifically to 
biological reproduction—at least in North America—
Western birth rates have been in sharp decline. 
According to a report on Canadian census data up 
to 2011, published in the National Post, “44.5% of 
couples are ‘without children’ compared to 39.2% with 
children” (O’Connor). Similar numbers are reported 
in the New York Times for the United States. Kate 
Bolick, reviewing Meghan Daum’s collection of essays 
Selfish, Shallow, and Self-Absorbed: Sixteen Writers on 
the Decision Not to Have Kids, cites a 2012 Center 
for Disease Control report in the U.S. indicating that 
“19 percent of American women reach their mid-40s 
without ever having a child—a figure that has nearly 
doubled in four decades.” Similarly, in Canada, the birth 
rate has been in steady decline. According to Bolick, the 
American report acknowledges that “among women in 
the 40–44 age bracket—the final reckoning, according 
to such surveys—22 percent were ‘childless by choice,’ 
compared with 35 percent who felt they didn’t have 
any say in the matter.” It is precisely the uncertain 
meaning and the unpredictable unfoldings of social 
non-reproduction that make it such a fascinating site 
of inquiry. If women in their (traditionally designated) 
child-bearing years are choosing more and more not 
to have babies (at least in North America), we may be 
entering the “age of non-reproduction.” Yet what such a 
declaration might mean is not at all clear.
The fact that people are writing about not having 
children and garnering great public fascination for such 
writing suggests that there is something culturally catchy 
about the phenomenon. It even has its own burgeoning 
literature. Statistical childlessness finds its narrative 
realization in testimonials about what it means not to 
reproduce. I like to call this emergent genre, which 
consists mostly of creative non-fiction essays, “kidless 
lit.” The best and most widely circulated example is 
Daum’s collection of essays reviewed by Bolick. Other 
important meditations on the phenomenon include 
Rebecca Solnit’s Harper’s Magazine essay “The Mother 
of All Questions,” Bolick’s Spinster: Making a Life of 
One’s Own, and Vivian Gornick’s The Odd Woman 
and the City.4 It is no coincidence that this body of 
writing is produced by and about women more than 
men (although it must be said that five out of the 
sixteen essays in the Daum collection were written 
by men). Nowhere are women more idealized or 
policed than as mothers, despite our collective failure 
to provide the social and financial supports necessary 
to child-rearing. Indeed, that policing in the form of 
presumptive motherhood extends to women who have 
not had children. Solnit recalls two conversations, both 
underwritten by the assumption that women should, in 
fact, have children: one took place after a public talk 
she gave about Virginia Woolf when the audience asked 
whether Woolf should have had children (leading Solnit 
to declare, finally, “Fuck this shit”); in another interview 
Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 7.2 (2015) 155Natasha Hurley
with a British man on a book about politics, she reports that, “instead of 
talking about the products of my mind, [he insisted] we should talk about 
the fruit of my loins, or the lack thereof.” In both cases, her interlocutors 
were incredulous in the face of suggestions that books might matter more 
to women than babies. Moreover, as Solnit says, “I’m not dogmatic about 
not having kids. I might have had them under other circumstances and 
been fine—as I am now.” Non-reproduction can be a state inhabited either 
polemically or with little fanfare. It might be the condition of women who 
have had abortions, of childless people more generally, and, indeed, of 
children themselves. In any case, it confronts us with a set of scripts that 
have been written long before our own interpellation into social life.
In this way, non-reproduction as a biological mode confronts us, in 
turn, with the problem of social reproduction. It is as a retort to such a 
consideration of social reproduction that non-reproduction finds itself at the 
heart of another emergent body of thought: social theories of reproduction 
and non-reproduction. While the critique of social reproduction has long 
been a staple of Marxist thought, especially Marxist feminist thought, 
interest in the term “non-reproduction” is relatively recent. Nina Power 
outlines “Brief Notes toward a Non-nihilistic Theory of Non-reproduction,” 
an article that follows “Non-reproductive Futurism: Rancière’s Rational 
Equality against Edelman’s Body Apolitic.” In the interests of outlining a 
queer rational politics inspired by a Rancièrean critique of Edelman, Power 
outlines examples of child relationality that cannot be recuperated fully 
into either biological or social reproduction per se. Another recent book, 
Chantal Jaquet’s Les transclasses ou la non-reproduction, which is as yet 
unavailable in English translation, takes the concept even further. Working 
with the thought of Spinoza and against that of Bourdieu, Jaquet argues that 
non-reproduction is an affective state defined by a gap, where the social 
order sidesteps reproduction per se. For Jaquet, non-reproduction is not the 
. . . non-reproduction 
as a biological mode 
confronts us, in turn, 
with the problem of 
social reproduction. 
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opposite of reproduction: “every non-reproduction is in 
some sense a reproduction by other means,” according 
to the blog Unemployed Negativity, which summarizes 
Jacquet’s insight in the following way: “Reproduction is 
an imitation of the immediate tastes and desires of one’s 
family and class, [whereas] non-reproduction, or what 
Jaquet calls transclass, often involves an imitation at a 
distance of the tastes and desires of others, a teacher, 
a friend from a different class, or the mediated images 
of a different life.” Jacquet’s work invites us to consider 
reproduction and non-reproduction less as opposites 
than as cognates or social kin.
The time, then, seems right to push the question 
further. How might this concept lead us to think 
differently about childhood? What gaps and affective 
states emerge as effects of non-reproduction? Under 
what conditions does childhood produce transclasses? 
What are the historical precursors of this social mode? 
Over, without being against, the prevailing conceptual 
demand that childhood makes on the concept of 
reproduction (where childhood serves as the very 
embodiment of reproduction), I want to suggest here 
that non-reproduction opens up alternative modes of 
social relations to the child. These relations exceed 
the norms of social and biological reproduction 
without refusing them entirely. In so doing, I propose 
a counterposition to the prevailing if understated 
importance of reproduction as one condition of 
possibility for childhood studies, with its apparent 
opposite: non-reproduction. What is beyond in loco 
parentis? What remains when we look beyond the 
family for terms of child relationality? Might there be 
grounds for considering forms of stranger sociability that 
do not merely replicate the well-worn tropes of danger 
and intergenerational perversion? Non-reproduction 
asks us to think about what it means to relate to children 
(as actual people and as abstractions) without presuming 
a familial or reproductive relation to them.
In addition to naming elusive and sometimes 
diminished social relations that exist frequently 
alongside familial and reproductive ones (not 
necessarily in contrast to them), non-reproduction 
usefully marks a state, an active set of political choices 
or refusals, and indeed a series of actions (not just 
inactions): in other words, that web of thought and 
agency that goes not only into being childless but also 
into interrupting reproduction without displacing it.
Theses on the Philosophy of Non-reproduction for 
Childhood
What follows are some provocations concerning 
what it might mean to expose the limits of reproductive 
thinking in the field of childhood studies and to 
embrace the paradox of non-reproductive child 
relationality. What might it mean, in other words, to 
think of the child as the figuration not of reproduction 
(or reproductive futurism) but of non-reproduction and 
to read the child non-reproductively?
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(Warning: these theses may contradict one another.)
1. Non-reproduction is the necessary underbelly of 
reproduction—its putative site of failure or abjection. 
Until reproduction is complete, non-reproduction 
threatens its realization. This formulation might seem 
to reduce to the following statement: the opposite 
of having children is not having children. Non-
reproduction attaches to reproduction, however, like an 
imaginary but unwelcome friend.
2. The value of the reproductive subject depends 
implicitly on the social fact (and frequent denigration) 
of the non-reproductive subject. A ticking biological 
clock resembles nothing more than the clock inside the 
crocodile that follows Captain Hook around in Peter 
Pan, threatening his very existence by reminding him of 
past tragedy and impending doom.
3. The child of our imaginary is not a biologically 
reproductive subject. The normative child is the non-
reproductive child. The reproductive child is a scandal. 
Reproduction is the fantasy and the issue (literally) of 
the adult.
4. Non-reproduction must be seen in both biological 
and ideological terms, but social and biological  
non-reproduction are not identical. The desire for  
social non-reproduction (where raising children is a 
political act) sometimes can hold in place the fetish 
of biological reproduction. Consider, for example, 
the paradox of red diaper babies: utopian offspring 
contained by the family form.5
5. Non-reproduction, as the refusal of reproduction, 
does not always exist in opposition to reproduction. In 
fact, reproductive and non-reproductive subjects stand 
in solidarity with each other all the time.
6. Childlessness is biologically non-reproductive but 
socially generative. 
7. Childlessness opens up the possibility for reading 
non-reproductively—that is, for reading the child as 
a stranger who need not be repatriated into modes of 
familial sociability.
8. Childlessness opens up the possibility of substitute 
child relations and interspecific kinship. 
9. Abortion is a site of non-reproduction, but not 
absolutely so. (a) Women who are/have been parents 
do still choose not to reproduce. Like reproduction, 
non-reproduction has to be chosen over and over again. 
According to statistics released by the Guttmacher 
Institution, a think tank dedicated to “advanc[ing] 
sexual and reproductive health and rights” (“About”), 
61% of women who had abortions had already given 
birth to at least one child (“Abortion”). (b) A feminist 
politics of abortion forces us to consider the possibility 
of non-reproductive futurity. As Barbara Johnson 
shows us, the non-reproductive future of abortion can 
produce powerful images of child and fetus relationality. 
Figuration and rhetoric expose to us the impossibilities 
of our own thought.
10. Non-reproduction opens up new possibilities for 
relating to the “spoiled” child, that is, a child spoiled by 
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social norms, where, for instance, familial structures of 
child relationality do not or cannot succeed or where the 
state neglects its duties of care. Under these conditions, 
it is essential to cultivate non-familial possibilities of 
child relationality. Stranger sociability becomes not just 
possible but necessary. Some of these forms of sociability 
take place within familial norms (including adoption and 
fostering). Others require that we rehabilitate the concept 
of the stranger and disentangle it from the danger with 
which it rhymes too easily.
11. One prehistory of the spoiled child is the history 
of race and racialization in North America: children 
disarticulated or stolen from their families (as effects 
of slavery, of residential schools, of internment, of 
child sexual abuse, of compulsory able-bodiedness) 
make political demands for the recognition of non-
reproductive relationality. Non-reproduction is 
sometimes shrouded in traumatic history and needs 
alternative afterlives.
12. Non-reproduction makes possible alternative 
temporalities for child relationality that disarticulate 
childhood from parent-child (or familial) relations: 
childhood without children (the man-child); the 
deployment of the concept of childhood in sexual role 
play; parentified children; idioms for intergenerational 
relationships; reversals of parent-child relations among 
adults (when parents are ill or need senior care). What 
might it mean to consider child relationality in rhetorical 
terms, beyond the traditional confines of parenthood?
13. Non-reproductive subjects have the potential to 
read non-parentally: to read the child as a political unit 
(for voting purposes, for public spending, and so forth), 
to read the child as a public good without necessarily 
entering into material relations of care with actual 
children. Concept children expand life chances for real, 
historical children.
Non-reproductive Futures of Childhood
It remains to be seen how the concept of non-
reproduction might be taken up for the purposes of 
new scholarly inquiry in our field. My hope would be 
that such a concept enables us, at the very least, to 
pursue productively the form and the significance of 
strangers for childhood and its cultures; that it might 
position us to revise what counts as parenthood and 
even, in some cases, to displace parenthood as the 
primary lens through which we view child-life; that 
non-reproduction, in Jaquet’s sense, opens up the study 
of childhood to new conceptualizations of affect; that 
the concepts and vocabularies of childhood could be 
tracked for the ways they circulate beyond the bodies 
and lives of actual children; that kidless lit could be 
taken as a more capacious object of study with an as yet 
unwritten history; that the figure of the child could be 
more and less than it is already.
Then again, perhaps even to propose futures for 
non-reproductive inquiries into childhood is already to 
contravene the very potential of the concept.
Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 7.2 (2015) 159Natasha Hurley
Notes
 1 In overviews of the field of childhood studies, “reproduction” 
stands as a key term of analysis. In her introduction to Children in 
Culture, Revisited: Further Approaches to Childhood, Karín Lesnik-
Oberstein points to Anthony Gidden’s work on social reproduction 
as essential to understanding the status of childhood as a site of 
social reproduction that is not reducible to adult ideology. She 
reads childhood studies and child participation in the social 
through Gidden’s suggestion that “every act which contributes to 
the reproduction of a structure is also an act of production and 
as such may initiate change by altering the structure at the same 
time as it reproduces it” (qtd. in Lesnik-Oberstein 12–13; emphasis 
added). Mary Jane Kehily takes a slightly different tack in An 
Introduction to Childhood Studies by positioning reproduction as 
a key vector of analysis for understanding the history of childhood 
in terms of gender and sexuality: at least since the medieval period 
in Europe, “appropriate sexuality,” she points out, “was closely 
tied to ideas about reproduction and marriage” (71; emphasis 
added). She adds that “[i]t is impossible to understand children’s 
sexuality without looking at the world views of their culture and 
without tying discussions to much wider issues of gender roles, 
reproduction, marriage rules and even cosmology” (78–79; 
emphasis added).
 2 Jack Halberstam worries that Edelman’s so-called anti-social 
thesis is nihilistic; José Esteban Muñoz and John Brenkman have 
each taken Edelman to task in different ways for ceding the ground 
of futurity, particularly for politics of race and class; Steven Bruhm 
and I have also suggested that Edelman disavows the queerness 
of childhood that actually opens up when the future is putatively 
heteronormative.
 3 Marxist feminists including Silvia Federici, Selma James, 
Rosemary Hennessey, Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, and 
more recently Madeline Lane-McKinley and Marija Cetinic have 
all pointed out that capitalism depends on child-rearing for the 
reproduction of labour for capital and for social and ideological 
reproduction within and beyond the domestic sphere. It seems 
clear that feminisms that foreground the gendered and racialized 
distribution of often unwaged labour have changed the commodity 
sphere of child-rearing.
 4 This literature has an interesting queer prehistory, too, in essays 
on bachelors and old maids or what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick calls 
“Tales of the Avunculate: Queer Tutelage in The Importance of 
Being Earnest” (52–72). In the extensive literature about old maids 
and bachelors, these characters’ non-reproduction designates 
queer modes and times of life circumscribed within and by 
reproductive norms themselves. What distinguishes these texts 
from the more recent genre of kidless lit, however, is that their 
characters historically are defined by not being married rather than 
by not having children, even if the two categories enjoy significant 
overlap. 
 5 In an unpublished paper, Marissa Brostoff argues in an analysis 
of red diaper babies that left melancholy assumes a childish form 
when Marxists inhabit the contradiction of producing a different 
political future while coming up against the intractable limits of 
familial institutions and conventions.
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